

Second Order Devolution: Empirical and Perceptual Evidence

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Abstract

In this paper, we explore changes in state-local relations. Our interest is the degree to which states have devolved power and authority to their localities...or not. From our empirical tests, we conclude that although centralization is the dominant trend, the pattern is somewhat uneven over time and variable across states. In our surveys, city managers report a loss of local power at the hands of state governments, which frequently act intrusively and only occasionally devolutionary.

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Second Order Devolution: Empirical and Perceptual Evidence

Federalism and intergovernmental relations have been topics commanding philosophical and scholarly attention since pre-Revolutionary days. From *The Federalist Papers* to contemporary congressional debates, the respective powers and responsibilities of the national and state governments have commanded the lion's share of attention. Less considered, but perhaps of equal significance today, is the relationship between the states and their 88,000 local governments.

Intergovernmental relationships exist in a fluid state, shifting in response to political, social, economic, and legal demands and constraints. Scholars have described these relationships using metaphorical terms such as layer and marble cakes, picket fences, networks, food chains, power relationships, and many others (Leach, 1970; Stewart, 1982). A seemingly endless quest for a rational and effective division of governmental responsibilities has produced little of lasting significance aside from, perhaps, a general agreement that the lowest capable level of government should be responsible for any given function or service.

There is also general consensus, as Judge Dillon ruled in *Clinton v. Cedar Rapids* (1868), that cities, counties, towns, townships, and myriad other types of localities are 'creatures of the state,' subject to state constitutional and statutory determinations of degrees of authority and discretion (Mead, 1997). Local government powers are neither inherent nor even specifically mentioned in the U.S. Constitution; rather, they are granted by the state expressly through charter or law, or through broad home rule provisions of local discretionary authority. In either case, it is the states that establish the machinery and

functional responsibilities of local governments. National government interactions with localities have been rather limited, typically involving either direct (e.g., General Revenue Sharing) or pass-through (e.g., categorical grants) funds for local government activities and services or, less desirably, in the form of preemptions and mandates. And though the U.S. Supreme Court has recently ruled favorably concerning state sovereignty and immunity, it continues to resist any explicit recognition of local autonomy (Davidson, 2007).

As U.S. federalism has evolved over more than 200 years, local governments have fallen from a place of colonial and post-colonial prominence to occupy the space at the bottom of the intergovernmental hierarchy. Yet there is extensive interstate variance in local discretionary powers, depending on state constitutional and statutory law, and particularly on the presence and strength of state-enacted home rule provisions. In some states, generally known as “Home Rule” or *Imperium in Imperio*¹ jurisdictions (Zimmerman, 1995: 29; McDonald, 2000;), local governments enjoy expansive powers of governance and discretion, whereas in other “Dillon’s Rule” states, they remain under the heavy thumb of the state.² The intergovernmental position of local governments also shifts over time. In recent years, for example, various versions of “New Federalism” have impacted localities, and in the eyes of some observers the “devolution revolution” of the 1990s contained portents of a “second order devolution” of powers and authority from the states to their local governments (Krane, 1990).

¹ Literally, “sovereignty within sovereignty.”

² Another conceptualization of local discretion is the so-called “Fordham Plan,” which suggests a devolution of powers model in which home rule jurisdictions may supersede special state laws unless explicitly forbidden to by the state (See Krane, Rigos, and Hill, 2001:12). A fourth conceptual approach to local discretionary authority is attributed to Michigan Judge Thomas Cooley, who wrote in the late 19th Century that local governments, as sovereigns, enjoy an inherent right to self-government (ACIR, 1993: 3). Cooley’s arguments have gained little traction.

Following a brief discussion of the evolution of federalism and intergovernmental relations as it relates to local governments, we turn our attention to contemporary state-local relationships. Using landmark research by G. Ross Stephens (1974) as a guide and reference point, we explore changes in levels of state centralization/decentralization of authority and responsibility over time, both in the aggregate and for individual states and common functions. Decentralization of financial responsibility, spending, and public employment serve as indicators of second order devolution. The empirical analysis is followed by an examination of perceptions of the quality of state-local relations in 2010 as offered by a sample of city managers. Our objective is to update Stephens' analysis to identify the most recent patterns of state centralization-decentralization and to compare the empirical results with perceptual data. The paper concludes with next steps for extending the research by addressing the "so what" question: what difference does centralization or decentralization make in terms of the quality and outcomes of government?

Local Discretion and the Tides of Federalism

A number of excellent histories of U.S. federalism have been written (e.g., Leach, 1970; Liner, 1989; Conlon, 1998; Walker, 2000; Krane, Ebdon, and Bartle, 2004), making it unnecessary to cover the same ground here. Running throughout the comprehensive federalism studies is a quest to "sort out" the appropriate division of powers among the three levels of government (Rivlin, 1992; Kodras, 1997). As noted above, that quest continues today with no Holy Grail having been sighted. The context of American government is too complex and dynamic to expect any sort of consensus on federal-state-local discretion or on which level of government should pay for and/or administer public services.

Since at least the late 1970s, there has been lively scholarly and political discussion of the devolution of powers in the federal system³ (e.g., Conlan, 1998; Kincaid, 1999; Walker, 2000). The purported advantages of devolution are well known, including service delivery efficiencies, aligning program costs with services delivered, fostering policy innovation, enhancing citizen responsiveness, offering greater government transparency and accountability, and relieving state legislatures from the burden of hearing and deciding on local bills (see Kincaid, 1998; Krane, Rigos, and Hill, 2001).

With the termination of General Revenue Sharing in 1986, the aggregation of numerous categorical grants into block grants, the congressional Republican majority's 1994 "Contract with America," a sustained federal fiscal crisis in the 1990s, a much-remarked upon shift in federal aid from places to people (Kincaid, 1998; 1999), and the broad agreement of state elected officials, the states putatively received more expansive responsibilities and financial resources from the national government (Sawicky, 1999; see Krane, Ebdon, and Bartle 2004: 514-515). Based on survey and other data, Cho and Wright (2004: 447) find a "distinct decline in the aggregate and average levels of national government fiscal and regulatory influence from 1994 to 1998," with the states as the primary beneficiaries.⁴ Similar findings are reported by Cole, Hissong, and Arvidson (1999). What can be said of local governments? Has devolution been mostly "a federal-state affair" (Kincaid, 1999:161)? Or has there been a second order devolution (SOD) of powers

³ By "devolution" we mean a transfer of governmental functions from a higher to a lower level of government. We recognize that there is a distinction between "administrative" devolution, which refers to discretion in program administration, and "substantive" devolution, which is the transfer of responsibility for a government program to a lower of government. Our research concerns both types. For an extensive discussion on the definitional dimensions of devolution, see Kincaid (1998).

⁴ Also see Bowman and Krause (2003) for a longitudinal analysis of changes in federal policy enactments and their impact on state authority.

and authority from the states to their cities, counties, and other general-purpose local governments? Some researchers (e.g., see Krane, Ebdon, and Bartle, 2004: 527) believe that local discretion has grown in “functional responsibilities, administrative procedures and systems, planning and economic development, and expenditures and revenues.” Perhaps the leading example of SOD is the role of local governments in most states in administering and making policy for the federal-state Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program (Gainsborough, 2003). Other scholars remark on increased local fiscal discretion granted by a growing number of states that have authorized local sales, income, occupancy, and service taxes as well as special fees and charges (Krane, 1999).

“Devo-skeptic” John Kincaid (1998, 1999) is unimpressed with what he perceives to be the rhetoric of devolution, asserting that national centralization continues apace, with a decided tilt towards “coercive federalism” through federal mandates, preemptions, and regulatory actions. According to Kincaid (1999) and Watson and Gold (1997), only a “de facto devolution” to local governments has occurred since the 1980s, as states, frequently consumed with their own budget problems, have pushed more responsibilities and costs to local governments. A National League of Cities report (2003) finds some evidence of SOD but laments that whereas it has meant that some federal and state program responsibilities have shifted to local governments, they have been accompanied by mandates and typically have arrived without sufficient local capacity or fiscal resources. Citizen initiatives and legislative actions to limit local taxing and spending have further handcuffed local governments in many states (MacKey, 1997; McCabe, 2000). Cole, Hissong, and Arvidson (1999:110) conclude that “very little by way of real devolution has yet occurred” between the states and localities.

Measuring State-Local Devolution

How do we objectively measure the levels, patterns, and variations of SOD? One attempt to operationalize local discretionary authority by Zimmerman (1981) identified four dimensions: structure (local power to determine the form and internal organization of government); function (which functions are performed locally); fiscal (local power to spend, borrow, and raise revenue); and personnel (number and types of local government employees). Based on a review of legal documents and mail surveys of state officials, government association executives, and state-local “experts,” Zimmerman developed five-point scales to represent the discretionary authority of cities and counties (ACIR, 1981). The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR, 1981: 7) and others (e.g., Berman and Martin, 1988) urge caution in using Zimmerman’s indices because of questions of data aggregation and an arbitrary weighting scheme.

Another, more careful and comprehensive effort to measure state centralization over time appeared in a 1974 *Journal of Politics* article by G. Ross Stephens.⁵ Eschewing formal state constitutional and statutory strictures on local governments—what Zimmerman refers to as “structure”—as presenting only a small part of state centralization⁶, Stephens (1974:52) explores what he calls the “manifestations of power.” He examines the distribution of finance and employment among the three levels of government since 1902, and develops a composite index of state centralization for 1957 and 1969 using three

⁵ Considering that Stephens must have been using computer punch cards and an early mainframe computer, one cannot fail to be impressed with this rather prodigious research effort.

⁶ It is well-established that “Home Rule” has different definitions and dimensions and is subject to varying interpretations by state legislatures and state courts. See Richardson, Jr., Gough, and Puentes (2003) for a thoughtful exposition on the vagaries of Home Rule.

components: financial responsibility (which level of government pays for specific services), service delivery (which level delivers various functional activities), and public personnel (the adjusted state-local distribution of employment for different services). He defines a centralized state as one that “controls basic public policy, allocates resources, and delivers public goods and services” (Stephens, 1974: 52).

Employing a continuum of zero to 100, Stephens classifies the states as centralized, decentralized, or balanced. Financial responsibility is measured as state (vs. local) share of domestic expenditures.⁷ With respect to service delivery, a fifteen-part service index measures the distribution of state and local spending by major function. Based on the proportion of state and local spending, each service is designated as centralized (state spends 60 percent or more), state services (state spends 55 to 59.9 percent), balanced (state spends 45-54.9 percent), local services (state spends 40 -44.9 percent), or decentralized (state spends 39.9 percent or less). Service scores were calculated across the states and within each state. The third indicator of centralization is an adjusted calculation of FTE state employment vs. FTE local employment for the various services. Stephens then compares 1957 and 1969 data to determine how state centralization has evolved.

Stephens’ two major findings are that (1) wide variation exists in the amount of state centralization, and (2) there is a general trend towards increased centralization with the states “increasingly providing more direct service, exercising greater control over basic public policy, accepting greater financial responsibility, ...and becoming more viable than their local counterparts” (Stephens, 1974: 48). Stephens’ composite rankings of state

⁷ State fiscal responsibility is measured as the total of direct state expenditures plus intergovernmental expenditures (to local governments).

centralization are later updated using 1995 data, adding additional support to his finding of increased state centralization (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000).

In further extending Stephens' data and analysis, the present research essentially replicates his approach and methodology, with slight variations. We collect Census Bureau data for each decade since 1969 up to the most recent data available for 2008. The first index component is calculated identically, with state financial responsibility measured as the portion of total state and local services funded at the state level; the remainder represents local financial responsibility.⁸

Stephens' second category, the service index, incorporates 15 functions; we reduce that number to ten in this study. Five functions are identical: police, corrections, health, hospitals, and natural resources. To account for the "end of welfare as we know it" through congressional enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, we collapse Stephens' two public welfare categories into one. For purposes of simplification, elementary and secondary education and libraries are combined into a single "education" category. We substitute parks and recreation for Stephens' outdated urban renewal variable, and combine separate highway construction and highway maintenance variables into a single measure labeled "highways." Finally, "financial administration" is added as a new measure and "airports" are excluded.⁹

⁸ Federal pass-through monies are included in the totals. When passed through to localities, federal aid is very difficult—if not impossible—to separate from state assistance to local governments. See Stephens (1974:55-57) for an extensive explanation.

⁹ Some of the service adjustments are attributable to differences in how the Census Bureau collects and categorizes data. Others reflect substantive changes in state-local responsibilities since 1969, such as, for instance, the relative insignificance of municipal airports and the end of urban renewal.

Following Stephens, we analyze the service data in two ways. First, based on the proportion of functional spending by the two levels of government, the ten services in each state are designated as centralized, state services, balanced, local services, or decentralized based on the percentage distributions described above. Second, state data are aggregated to indicate how, on a national level, individual services can be categorized.

The third index category, public employment, is analyzed with data on the number of state and local government employees for the decades since 1969. Again following Stephens, we make a statistical adjustment for labor inputs to account for the labor intensity of local government services compared to those delivered primarily by states.¹⁰

In keeping with Stephens, but unlike Zimmerman (1981), we do not disaggregate our data by type of local government. Thus, state centralization indices are calculated as composite scores for cities, counties, towns, and townships---the general purpose governments. We are interested in the broad dimensions of state centralization rather than its implications for specific categories of localities.

Empirical Findings

To place the analysis within its broadest context, Table 1 displays the distribution of revenues, expenditures, and employment for all levels of government from the first year such figures became available in 1902, 1970 (the most recent data shown in Stephens [1974]), and (due vagaries of federal data collection and availability) additional time periods

¹⁰ See Stephens (1974:63). FTE state employees (A) are divided by state public expenditures (C), producing (E), and FTE local employees (B) are divided by local public expenditures (D), producing (F). (F) is divided by (E) to calculate a labor input ration, which is then multiplied by (A) to give the percentage of state vs. local employees.

ending in either 1995 or 2008.¹¹ The absolute scope of government activities expanded at all levels (not shown). But the abrupt shift in relative financial responsibility since 1902 is striking. Having collected more than half of all domestic revenues and spent well over 60 percent of outlays at the turn of the 20th century, local governments' share of both dropped precipitously. According to Stephens (1974: 50), the largest change occurred from 1913 to 1942.

Table 1 here

The trends beginning in 1970 are interesting. The proportion of federal own-source revenues gradually declined in relation to state own-source revenues from 62 percent to 55.6 percent. Local revenues have been fairly stable at just over 18 percent. State revenues have shown a gradual increase of nearly 6 points (29 percent). With respect to proportions of domestic expenditures, the federal share has remained relatively unchanged whereas the state share has inched up by some 2.6 percentage points, accompanied by a decline in the local share of about 3 points.

Unadjusted public employment numbers have been relatively stable, with local governments consistently employing a much greater percentage of all public workers than either the federal or state jurisdictions.

At the aggregate level, then, the states have become more important collectors and spenders of money whereas local governments have assumed a diminished role. Public employment has continued to be dominated by local government. Table 2 illustrates these trends more tellingly by extracting federal figures and showing what remains as the relative

¹¹ Revenues are not incorporated into the financial responsibility index. They are mentioned here only to provide a different means of looking at state-local financial relationships. We will incorporate the revenue-raising side of financial responsibility into a later paper.

shares of total state-local finances and employment. The total increase since 1970 in state own-source revenues approaches 12 percent. A gradual gain of nearly 5 points in the state share of expenditures has been registered. Unadjusted public employment figures continue to be relatively stable.

Table 2 here

Taken together, tables 1 and 2 afford no sign of second order devolution. To the contrary, they furnish evidence of extended centralization of state financial responsibility during the past four decades.

As mentioned earlier, Stephens' (1974: 52-55) developed a continuum (index) of state centralization that provides us with a different means of viewing changes in state-local relations over time. Table 3 contains the results of applying the Stephens index for domestic expenditures and revenues for 1978 and the three subsequent decades. In the upper portion of Table 3, the index is calculated for expenditures for each state across the ten services noted above.¹² The "pronounced centralization of government in the twentieth century" found by Stephens (1974: 58) continues apace. In 1957 (not shown) only 16 states were identified as centralized in expenditures. By 2008, all 50 had fallen into the "centralized" category of 60 percent or more of total state-local spending being accounted for by the states.

Table 3 here

The lower part of Table 3 applies Stephens' scheme to own-source revenues. Between 1978 and 2006, revenue collection became increasingly centralized at the state level, with the number of "centralized" states rising from 27 in 1978 to 41 in 2006. In the

¹² For 1957 and 1969, Stephens's original 15 services are used. The scores are determined by applying the index scores for each state.

most recent year for which data are available, no states fell into the “decentralized” or “local services” categories.

Moving now to the distribution of state/local responsibility for our ten services, we follow Stephens’ (1974: 59-60) path by assigning weights indicating centralized (7), balanced (4), or local (1) responsibility for each service, based on total state and local expenditures. The possible range is from ten to 70. We aggregate the service scores and situate each state on Stephens’ continuum from centralized to decentralized (adjusted to account for ten services versus Stephens’ 15). Table 4 reveals the ordering of the states for the years indicated.

Table 4 here

The results are fairly consistent for 1978-1998, but somewhat surprising for 2006, as some ten states drop out of the “centralized” category and four (TX, NV, MN, NY) actually enter the realm of “decentralized.” The implication is that local governments are financing a growing proportion of service expenditures.

Some degree of support for signs of increased decentralization of service expenditure responsibilities is exhibited in Table 5, which displays the state proportion of state/local public employment, organized by the same five decentralization categories used in previous tables. For comparison purposes both unadjusted and adjusted personnel scores are shown.

Table 5 here

Clearly public employment remains the most decentralized of our three measures. The raw data show that the states categorized as decentralized have varied from 45 to 50 over the past fifty years. One to three states have measured up as centralized; none has fallen

into the remaining three categories in between the extremes of centralized-decentralized. The adjusted data reveal greater variation along the spectrum. Only a single state, Hawaii, has remained centralized in public employment since 1957. For 2008, Alaska and Delaware are listed as balanced and North Dakota as local services. The number of decentralized states has actually grown significantly from 21 in 1957 to a total of 46 in 2008. The numbers of balanced and local services states have fallen from 15 and 11 in 1957 to only two and one, respectively, in 2008. The changes regarding the number and types of services we incorporated into this research certainly could have had an impact on the notable shift in public employment outcomes since Stephens' earlier work. Notwithstanding the altered services measurements, our more recent data from 1978 to the present also indicate that decentralization of personnel has grown slightly over the past 30 years.

It is apparent that a considerable range exists across the states in the distribution of financial responsibility, services, and public employment. To indicate the relative position of the states on the centralization-decentralization spectrum, a composite score is computed for each of them. The composite is a simple average of state scores on the three components of centralization. Stephens' (1974: 67) composite scores were calculated for 1957 and 1969 and Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) compiled them for 1995. The general finding was a growth in the composite centralization index from an average 1957 score of 47.1 to 51.6 in 1969 and to 58.0 in 1995 (when no states were scored as "decentralized").

Table 6 displays the 50 state composite scores from Stephens' 1957 and 1969 research and our new scores for four decades that follow. (It is important to remind the reader that scores from the Stephens' years are not calculated using the same services and that there could be other anomalies as well). Average composite scores from 1978 to 2008

changed very little, varying from 40.6 to 42.0. Alaska, Delaware, and Hawaii are most consistently categorized as “centralized,” though Rhode Island makes that list in 1988. Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, New York, Texas, and Wyoming are placed in the “decentralized” group for at least three of the past four decades. Most states show minor changes from one decade to the next. The “balanced” category captures the largest proportion of the states during all years.

Table 6 here

The level of state flux from 1978 to 2008 is discernible in Table 7. Again employing a scale employed by Stephens we find that New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Delaware have experienced the greatest centralization over these three decades. Fifteen states have added from 2.0 to 4.9 points to their composite centralization scores, 23 have changed very little, and eight have become more decentralized by scores ranging from -2.0 to -4.9. Nevada is well out in front of the decentralizing states, having declined by 7.3 points over the three decades. Overall, more states have boosted their centralization scores than depressed them. The average change over time is + 0.64.

A tendency of states that are small in geography and population (e.g., Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island) to appear in the more centralized categories is easily recognizable in tables 6 and 7. Similarly, four of the largest states (Florida, New York, California, Texas) lean towards the decentralized end of the continuum. Logically, small states are simpler to govern and administer from the center than are large states; moreover, they tend to have a smaller number of local government units (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000: 125-127). Future research will explore the precipitators and correlates of state centralization, including size.

Table 7 here

The empirical realities are one matter, but what of the perceptual realities? Do they square with the more nuanced understanding of centralization and devolution reported here? It is to this issue that we now turn.

Perceiving State-Local Devolution

To ascertain the perceptions of local officials regarding state-local relations, we conducted a survey of city managers across the country.¹³ City managers are an appropriate set of officials to query, given their central role in administering municipal governments (Svara, 1990; Nalbandian, 2000; Renner, 2001; Feldman and Khademian, 2002). Their job requires them to take a broad view of city operations and to stay abreast of changes in state policies and finances. Consequently, city managers are well-positioned to assess the impact of state actions on localities.

To probe managers' perceptions of state-local relations and how they have changed since 2000, a survey was created by the authors and pilot-tested with city managers in five jurisdictions.¹⁴ The pilot test led to modification of the design and revision of the wording of several questions on the survey instrument. The final survey contained 11 questions, four of which were multi-part. The questions explored several aspects of the state-local dynamic including the frequency of state intrusion, the amount of devolution, the change in city governments' power and authority in various policy domains, and the impact of state mandates.

¹³ City managers in 49 of the 50 states were surveyed, only Hawaii was not included.

¹⁴ The survey instrument was constructed following the guidelines of Dillman, et al. (2009).

A random sample of 600 city managers in cities with populations greater than 25,000 was provided by the International City/County Management Association. After eliminating managers with name/address problems that could not be easily rectified and managers who were no longer employed, a list of 585 current city managers remained. The survey was mailed to these individuals in early January 2010.¹⁵ As of mid-February 2010, a total of 209 usable surveys had been returned, producing a response rate of 36 percent. The pool of respondents is reflective of the total sample and gives no indication of over or under-representation of managers in particular states. These responses serve as the database for the discussion below.

Perceptual Findings

City managers report significant intrusion by state government into the affairs of city government. Table 8, which displays the frequency and type of intrusion or preemption, shows that the legislature, with a frequency score of 3.6, is the most regular intruder, followed by state courts (2.89).¹⁶ Less frequently occurring are intrusions or preemptions as a result of referenda or voter initiatives. As for the types of intrusive or preemptive actions, it is clear that two particular types of actions pack a powerful fiscal wallop and happen often. According to city managers, state government since 2000 has regularly raided local revenue sources and also shifted new costs to cities. Both of these activities weaken a city's capacity to provide public services effectively. In sum, from the perspective of city

¹⁵ The initial survey mailing was followed 2 weeks later by a postcard "thank you/reminder."

¹⁶ The response options offered ranged from a low of 1 to a high of 4, with 2.5 as the midpoint.

managers, since 2000, state governments' shadow over localities has expanded and darkened.

Table 8 here

When asked about the areas in which the city has experienced “the most significant state intrusion or preemption of power and authority,” 77 percent of the managers selected the fiscal area (e.g., taxing, spending, borrowing). Another question pursued a similar theme but from a different angle. Table 9 displays the frequencies for this item: “how much devolution (shifting) of responsibility from state government to city government has occurred in your state, in the following areas?” Fully one-third of the respondents indicated that substantial devolution had occurred in finance, with another quarter of the respondents reporting modest devolution. According to the managers, only service provision has been devolved to a comparable degree. The areas of home rule and personnel are distinctive in that more than one-third of managers report no devolution in those areas. Note that this question focused on the extent of devolution, not its potentially positive or negative nature.

Table 9 here

Two sets of questions addressed 12 specific policy areas; one focused on the impact of state mandates on city governments, the other on changes in city discretion and authority. The 12 policy areas match the ten service functions used in the calculations above as well as two additional activities important to localities: economic development and land use and planning. The mandates question asked city managers to assess whether the impact of state mandates since 2000 had been positive or negative, significant or modest. Their responses were scored in this manner: -2 if mandates had been negative and significant, -1 if negative and modest, +1 if positive and modest, +2 if positive and significant. A zero was recorded

for responses indicating that mandates had had a negligible impact.¹⁷ Averages were calculated for each policy area and the results are arrayed in Figure 1.

Figure 1 here

As Figure 1 shows, in none of the policy areas do city managers consider the impact of state mandates, regardless of their source, to be positive. In all 12 policy areas, managers indicate that mandates have had a negative effect. The magnitude of the negative effect varies from -0.31 for parks and recreation to -1.27 for education. In two other policy areas, the impact of mandates has been especially negative: financial administration (-1.26) and land use and planning (-1.05). We assume that the variation across policy areas reflects the perception of the impact of state mandates on cities; however we acknowledge that some is likely related to differentials in responsibility for these policies. Many cities do not operate hospitals or corrections facilities; education may fall within the purview of a separate school district. However, the question was worded generally—it did not ask about the impact on a specific city but rather on cities as a whole.

The issue of city governments' discretion and authority for various policy areas was pursued in a related question. Managers were asked whether city governments' degree of discretion, power, and authority in the same policy areas had increased (+1), decreased (-1), or stayed about the same (0).¹⁸ Table 10 shows the averages for each of the policy areas on this question.

¹⁷ Respondents were also given a "Don't Know/Not Applicable" option which was not scored. The percentage of respondents selecting DK/NA ranged from 1.9% for land use and planning policy to 67.5% for hospitals. Other policy areas in which the DK/NA response was greater than 10% were corrections (58.4%), education (48.8%), welfare (47.4%), health (44.5%), and natural resources (17.7%).

¹⁸ As with the preceding question, respondents were given a "Don't Know/Not Applicable" option. The percentage of respondents answering DK/NA ranged from 0.96% to economic development and land use and

Table 10 here

City managers describe a situation in which city governments' authority has been circumscribed over time. In each of the policy areas, managers report a decrease in discretionary power since 2000. However, in several instances the level of the decline is nominal: -0.04 in parks and recreation, -0.11 (health), -0.13 (police), -0.14 (hospitals) and -0.17 (public welfare). In other policy areas, the decrease is greater: financial administration (-0.58), land use and planning (-0.54), and natural resources (-0.44). Thus it is fair to say that although city managers report a loss of discretion, power, and authority in each of the twelve policy areas, the magnitude of the loss is relatively modest in most. Within policy areas, there is much similarity between the responses for the mandates question and those for the discretion question, suggesting a not unexpected linkage. After all, one of the purposes of state mandates is to diminish the discretion that localities possess.

The preceding discussion has reported aggregated responses from the 209 city managers who had returned the survey by mid-February 2010. Although aggregate data provide a useful overview of managerial perceptions, a more fine-grained look at the responses is imperative. Given that our focus is on the state-local relationship, we categorized city manager respondents by state. Table 11 displays responses to the questions about sources and types of intrusion, averaged by state. Only states in which five or more managers returned surveys (14 states) are included.

Table 11 here

The table reveals some interesting patterns across and within states. Although the legislature is the source of most frequent intrusive behavior, the degree varies from a high of

planning to 66% for hospitals. Other policy with more than 10% selecting DK/NA were corrections (58.4%), education (47.4%), health (41.2%), welfare (39.2%), and natural resources (17.7%).

4.0 in Florida (the maximum score possible) to a low of 2.8 in Pennsylvania. Other states with frequently intrusive legislatures are Wisconsin, Texas, South Carolina, Illinois, and Utah. When the focus shifts to state court systems, the most frequent intrusion occurs in Illinois, followed by New Jersey, Washington, and California. By comparison, courts in South Carolina and Kansas are substantially less bothersome. Not surprisingly, California leads the other states in terms of intrusive referenda or voter initiatives, followed by Washington and Florida. And while voters in all of these states pose less of a problem to cities than legislatures or courts, they are especially non-factors in New Jersey and Wisconsin, with average scores of 1.29 and 1.33, respectively. Considering that the Garden and Badger states do not authorize a statewide initiative process, and that California, Washington, and Florida do, this result does not surprise. When the scores for the three sources of intrusion are summed, in the assessment of city managers in the state, cities in California, Washington, and Florida have experienced the most interference since 2000; Kansas and Pennsylvania the least.

The last two columns of Table 11 show the frequency with which these states engage in two disagreeable fiscal actions: raiding local revenue sources and shifting new costs to cities. Both of these actions have a decidedly negative impact on the local fisc, but in tandem, they represent a significant constraint. The data in Table 11 show that California cities are subject to frequent revenues raids (3.89), as are cities in Michigan (3.83), Wisconsin (3.67) and Minnesota (3.63). In a related vein, Illinois (3.89), Texas (3.73), California (3.72), Florida (3.69), and Michigan (3.67) frequently off-load new costs onto cities. The combined impact of raids and cost-shifts has hit California and Michigan cities particularly hard, perhaps prompting historically-inclined managers to reflect upon the

intrusions and taxes laid upon the European peoples by the imperialistic Romans. But other states such as Pennsylvania and Missouri are subject to substantially fewer of these fiscal actions.

It is clear from the survey findings that, in the eyes of city managers, cities have been taking it on the chin over the past several years. The state is interfering more frequently in city matters and city policy space has shrunk. Some devolution has occurred, especially in service provision and finance, but it has not necessarily empowered cities. City governments have found their discretion curtailed, their power and authority diminished at the hands of state government. When the data are disaggregated by state, the degree to which these phenomena have occurred varies. For instance, California city managers describe state-local relations with powerful adjectives such as “very poor,” “broken,” and “dysfunctional.” In states, the negative descriptors are less extreme, with words such as “changed” and “weakened” are used instead. But overall, from the perspective of these well-positioned local officials, the state-local dynamic has shifted in a direction not to their liking.

Discussion

There are two primary impulses behind state decentralization. What one might refer to as *purposive devolution* is consciously designed and intentional. State officials have weighed the pros and cons of devolving a program or responsibility before making their decision. *Accidental devolution* is largely unplanned. A state (or the federal government) devolves a program or activity to local governments as a means of sloughing off expenditures or other obligations. Such “de facto devolution” (Watson and Gold, 1997:2) may involve a mandate

or administrative decision and typically comes without adequate authority or fiscal capacity for appropriate program execution. The results may be unpleasant. As Krane, Ebdon, and Bartle, 2004:516) pithily observe, “If local governments are the ‘workhorses’ of American federalism, then ‘second-order’ devolution piled more work on the horse but gave it less to eat.”

Whatever one’s preferences are regarding state centralization or decentralization, it is important not to overlook the critical issue of capacity. Ultimately, states are the principal players in SOD, but successful SOD is determined by the capacity of local governments to implement and support devolved responsibilities (Marando and Florestano, 1990; Gargan 1997; Kodras, 2001). Purposive SOD normally presumes a basic level of local government capacity and a basic level of competence to perform new or enlarged responsibilities. Premature devolution, like most everything else premature, is to be avoided; it can result in a state reclaiming devolved responsibilities from feckless local governments. Local governance capacity varies among the states and within states. For example, approximately one-third of local governments in the United States have no paid employees (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000:129), making those unlikely candidates for successfully implementing new programmatic responsibilities. Variable capacity is implicitly recognized in Home Rule acts that apply differentially to cities and counties or to different sized jurisdictions (Krane, Rigos, and Hill, 2001:3). Even the city managers acknowledged this point. When asked if city governments had sufficient administrative capacity were the state to devolve more power and authority, only 29 percent answered affirmatively. Another 46 percent said that it depended on the policy area.

Conclusion

Our empirical and perceptual examinations of SOD have revealed some interesting findings. It is apparent that the premise that SOD would naturally follow the “Devolution Revolution” of federal authority and responsibilities to the states was incorrect. States have enlarged their financial and service responsibilities to be sure, but much of this accretion of responsibilities has come at the expense of local governments. States are raising a larger proportion of revenues and accounting for a greater proportion of service expenditures. Perhaps that they have done so without also capturing a larger proportion of state-local employment is an indication that local governments are at risk of becoming mere administrative instruments of the states. Indeed, even as state centralization has occurred, public employment has become even more dominated by local government. Managers are not pleased with these developments and they did not mind telling us so.

As always, there is variation from state to state and from service to service. Our data show that some states continue to treat their local jurisdictions in consonance with the concept of *imperium in imperio*, whereas others—the majority—remain Dillon’s Rule adherents. As for functional differentiation, financial administration, land use and planning, and natural resources are trending towards high levels of centralization, whereas parks and recreation, police, welfare, and health care are more decentralized.

An important topic for future research, a next step if you will, could be Third Order Devolution, or TOD. What Light (1999) has called “shadow government” as a metaphor for increasing contracting out of federal defense and domestic activities has salience at the local government level as well. Though local government outsourcing, franchising, and contracting out may cast a pale shadow in comparison to that of the federal government, it is

darkening. TANF may represent an example of SOD, but many of the local government activities under TANF are contracted out to private and nonprofit service providers (Cole, Hisson, and Arvidson, 1999). And contracting out extends beyond the TANF program. Fully one-third of the city managers responding to our survey indicated that their city regularly involves for-profit and not-for-profit organizations in service delivery; another 48 percent reported occasional use of these groups.

Such a trend was perhaps first identified by Schmandt and Goldbach (1969), who suggested that there are three phases in the contemporary evolution of American cities, from the ‘political’ city to the ‘administrative’ city, followed by the ‘contract’ city that TOD represents and New Public Management principles exemplify (Savas, 2005; Freeman and Minow, 2007). The number of special purpose governments has soared until the count is essentially equal to the total number of general purpose local governments (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000:132; West and Berman, 2009:327-8). Airports, water and sewer services, libraries, parks and recreation, and other services are increasingly delivered by special purpose districts. The rise of homeowners associations and residential community associations has offset the need of local governments to extend some basic services to new residential developments. Such shadow governments many help alleviate local service deficiencies, but they fall short in public accountability and complicate the structure of local government (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000:133).

Our next steps include an exploration of the implications of our research, using the centralization index as an independent and dependent variable. What are the correlates or precursors of centralization/decentralization? What difference does the distribution of state-local financial, service, and employment responsibilities make? Does increased state

centralization interfere with local government affairs or infringe on traditional powers? Does increased state funding of services unbalance, skew, or displace local priorities? Do the trends mesh with public preferences as voiced in surveys of citizens' trust in government and of taxing/spending priorities? And, looking at the issue from a different perspective, how do state policymakers perceive the state-local dynamic?

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Table 1. Distribution of Finances and Employment between Levels of Government

Financial Responsibility	1902	1970	1978	1988	1995	2008 ^a
Revenues						
Federal	38%	62%	58.8%	56.9%	55.6%	X
State	11	20	23.4	24.4	25.8	X
Local	51	18	17.8	18.7	18.6	X
Domestic Expenditures						
Federal	22	55.5	53.8	57.1	55.8	X
State	10	16.9	18.3	17.3	19.5	
Local	68	27.6	27.9	25.6	24.6	X
Public Employment						
Federal	21	14.5	20	19	16	14
State	11	23.0	22	24	23	23
Local	68	62.5	58	57	61	64

^a Comparable data on Federal Government finances have not been collected since FY 1995.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Data

(<http://www2.census.gov/pub/outgoing/govs/special60/>).

Table 2. Distribution of Finances and Employment in State and Local Government

<u>Financial Responsibility:</u>	1970	1978	1988	1998	2006
Revenues (own source):					
State	53.6%	56.8%	56.6%	58.8	59.3
Local	46.4	43.1	43.3	41.2	40.7
Domestic Expenditures:					
State	48.1	49.4	49.7	51.5	53.0
Local	51.9	50.6	50.3	48.5	47.0
Public Employment					
					(2007)
State	27.0	27.7	29.1	27.5	26.2
Local	73.0	72.3	70.9	72.5	73.8

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (<http://www2.census.gov/pub/outgoing/govs/special60/>).

Table 3. State Financial Responsibility for Selected Years (1978-2008)

<u>Domestic Expenditures</u>	1978	1988	1998	2008
Category:				
Centralized	45	49	48	50
State Services	3	1	2	-
Balanced	2	-	-	-
Local Services	-	-	-	-
Decentralized	-	-	-	-
Total:	50	50	50	50
<u>Total Revenues</u>				
Category:	1978	1988	1998	2006
Centralized	27	28	33	41
State Services	11	12	7	8
Balanced	10	9	10	1
Local Services	1	-	-	-
Decentralized	1	1	-	-
Total:	50	50	50	50

Table 4: State/Local Service Expenditures Typology Based on Distribution of 10 Major Services

1978		1988		1998		2006
Classification	Index	Classification	Index	Classification	Index	Classification
Centralized (34)	HI-58, VT-58, RI-52, AK-52, NM-52, WV-52, AR-52, DE-52, KY-52, MT-52, UT-52, LA-49, ME-49, CT-49, NH-49, ND-49, SD-49, WY-46, VA-46, MA-46, OK-46, NV-46, AL-43, ID-43, IL-43, MD-43, SC-43, IN-43, MO-43, OH-43, TN-43, OR-43, IA-42	Centralized (34)	VT-58, HI-58, MA-58, RI-55, NJ-55, MT-52, NH-52, AR-52, ND-52, DE-52, KY-52, CT-52, MA-49, WV-49, NM-49, UT-46, MD-46, OK-46, VA-46, OH-46, SC-46, WY-46, SD-46, WA-46, IL-46, NV-46, AK-46, AL-43, IN-43, CO-43, LA-43, TN-43, ID-43, OR-43	Centralized (33)	DE-58, NJ-58, VT-55, RI-55, MD-52, HI-52, LA-52, NM-52, WV-52, CT-52, MA-52, NH-52, UT-49, KY-49, AR-49, MT-49, VA-49, SD-49, ND-49, MO-46, PA-46, AL-46, IN-46, ME-46, WY-46, OK-46, AZ-43, OH-43, MS-43, OR-43, ID-43, NE-43, KS-43	Centralized (23)
State Services (6)	FL-40, TX-40, MS-40, WA-40, PA-40, NJ-40	State Services (6)	FL-40, MS-40, NC-40, PA-40, GA-40, NE-40	State Services (6)	AL-40, TN-40, IL-40, TX-40, IA-40, WA-40	State Services (10)
Balanced (7)	AZ-37, GA-37, MI-34, NC-34, CO-34, KS-34, NE-34	Balanced (7)	MT-38, MI-37, AZ-37, NY-37, IA-34, TX-34, WI-34	Balanced (9)	WI-37, CO-37, NV-37, FL-37, NC-37, GA-37, SC-34, CA-34, MI-34	Balanced (11)
Local Services (1)	WI-31	Local Services (1)	CA-31	Local Services (2)	MN-31, NY-31	Local Services (2)
Decentralized (3)	NY-28, MN-25, CA-25	Decentralized (1)	MN-28	Decentralized (0)		Decentralized (4)

Table 5
State Proportion of State & Local Personnel 1957-2008

	Raw Data					
Classification	1957	1969	1978	1988	1998	2008
Centralized, 60.0+	2	1	N/A	2 (AK,HI)	2 (DE, HI)	3 (DE, HI, NJ)
State Services, 55.0-59.9	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Balanced, 45.0-54.9	N/A	3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Local Services, 40.0-44.9	2	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Decentralized, 39.9 or less	45	45	50	48	48	47
Total:	50	50	50	50	50	50

Table 5 Continued...

	Adjusted, Using Labor Input Ratios					
Classification	1957	1969	1978	1988	1998	2008
Centralized, 6.0+	2	4	1 (HI)	1 (HI)	1 (HI)	1 (HI)
State Services, 55.0-59.9	1	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Balanced, 45.0-54.9	15	17	3 (AK, DE VT)	2 (AK, DE)	2 (AK, DE)	2 (AK, DE)
Local Services, 40.0-44.9	11	12	4 (NM, RI, UT, WV)	5 (NM, ND, RI, UT,VT)	4 (ND, RI, UT, VT)	1 (ND)
Decentralized, 39.9 or less	21	16	42	42	43	46
Total	50	50	50	50	50	50

Table 6. Composite Ranking of the 50 States

Category (Number of States, 1957-2008)	1957 (Stephens)	1969 (Stephens)	1978	1988	1998	2008
Centralized (4/6/4/3/3/3)	HI (71.6) DE (66.1) NM (60.85) WV (60.4)	HI (81.0) AK (74.9) VT (66.7) WV (65.1) DE (61.0) RI (60.0)	AK (62.8) DE (59.5) HI (74.9) VT (60.9)	DE (63.7) HI (75.6) RI (60.3)	AK (59.6) DE (66.0) HI (76.1)	AK (60.8) DE (65.3) HI (78.0)
State Services (5/9/3/2/3/6)	AK (59.9) LA (58.2) NC (57.7) AR (57.1) OK (55.0)	NM (59.8) SC (59.3) KY(59.1) UT (58.8) LA (58.2) OK (58.1) MI (55.9) ID (55.4) ND (55.0)	KY (55.2) RI (58.5) WV (57.5)	AK (58.5) VT (58.6)	RI (58.8) VT (57.7) WV (54.9)	AR (55.0) NM (54.8) ND (54.9) RI (56.9) VT (59.4) WV (56.3)
Balanced (20/24/19/25/25/20)	CT (54.4) KY (54.1) ME (53.6) SC (53.1) VT (52.4) MT (51.6) OR (51.5) RI (51.3) AL (51.3) MS (51.3) NH (51.2) NV (51.0) VA (50.9) ND (50.0) WA (49.2) SD (49.1) UT (49.1) ID (48.8) WY (47.0) AZ (45.4)	MT (54.8) MS (54.1) CT (53.4) WA (53.3) PA (53.2) SD (53.2) AL (52.9) AR (52.4) NH (51.3) NC (51.2) TN (50.7) OR (49.9) GA (49.7) WY (49.7) VA (49.1) AZ (48.9) NV (48.8) MO (48.3) TX (47.5) MA (47.3) IA (46.4) CO (46.2) FL (45.6) MI (45.5)	AL (48.5) AR (51.7) CT (48.7) ID (48.3) LA (47.7) ME (52.4) MD (45.0) MS (46.5) MT (48.6) NH (49.8) NM (54.1) ND (50.7) OK (48.3) PA (45.4) SC (51.9) SD (49.7) UT (52.1) VA (48.5) WY (46.0)	AL (48.3) AR (50.3) CT (52.6) ID (47.2) IN (44.6) IA (44.5) KY (53.1) LA (48.0) ME (52.3) MD (48.9) MA (50.2) MS (45.0) MT (51.4) NH (48.7) NJ (46.3) NM (52.3) ND (54.2) OK (49.6) SC	AL (45.6) AR (52.4) CT (54.3) ID (54.3) KY (44.9) LA (52.6) LA (50.2) ME (49.3) MD (49.9) MA (50.1) MS (47.5) MO (45.0) MT (53.5) NH (48.8) NJ	AL (45.2) CT (52.2) ID (45.3) KY (53.5) LA (48.2) ME (51.6) MD (49.3) MA (49.3) MS (49.3) LA (46.9) MO (44.8) MT (53.0) NH (46.8) NJ (49.7) OK

				(53.2) SD (48.1) UT (49.1) VA (46.9) WA (45.4) WV (54.2) WY (45.9)	(47.8) NM (52.8) ND (53.1) OK (48.7) OR (44.8) PA (45.9) SC (50.0) SD (48.6) UT (51.0) VA (45.3) WA (44.7) WY (44.6)	(49.0) OR (46.5) PA (45.6) SC (49.8) SD (49.8) UT (51.2) WA (45.9)
Local Services (8/6/15/11/11/13)	PA (44.9) MO (44.8) GA (44.1) FL (42.5) MI (41.7) TN (41.5) MD (40.6) KS (40.3)	IL (44.6) MD (43.9) IN (43.2) WI (42.8) MN (41.6) KS (40.0)	GA (41.9) IL (40.4) IN (41.3) IA (42.2) KS (39.9) MA (43.0) MI (40.1) MO (42.0) NV (44.4) NJ (40.1) NC (43.9) OH (40.1) OR (44.0) TN (41.2) WA (43.4)	GA (40.6) IL (41.2) KS (41.7) MI (42.4) MO (44.4) NV (43.0) NC (43.8) OH (42.0) OR (44.1) PA (43.7) TN (41.5)	AZ (40.1) GA (40.6) IL (40.1) IN (42.5) IA (44.4) KS (41.4) MI (41.4) NE (39.9) NC (43.3) OH (41.8) TN (40.9)	GA (39.5) IN (41.6) IA (43.3) KS (40.4) MI (42.9) MN (40.7) NE (41.0) NC (43.2) OH (42.4) TN (41.4) VA (43.5) WI (41.0) WY

						(44.2)
Decentralized (13/5/9/9/8/8)	IA (39.8) IN (38.9) MA (38.6) TX (38.0) CO (37.6) OH (37.1) MN (34.1) IL (33.4) NE (33.4) CA (32.4) WI (31.6) NJ (29.9) NY (28.9)	OH (39.9) CA (39.1) NE (38.8) NY (36.1) NJ (35.0)	AZ (38.2) CA (33.9) CO (38.4) FL (37.9) MN (39.1) NE (36.6) NY (33.6) TX (38.8) WI (38.6)	AZ (36.5) CA (35.0) CO (38.0) FL (37.0) MN (38.5) NE (38.5) NY (38.4) TX (35.4) WI (38.7)	CA (35.5) CO (38.7) FL (37.5) MN (38.8) NV (38.0) NY (37.8) TX (38.8) WI (38.9)	AZ (38.6) CA (37.0) CO (37.7) FL (36.4) IL (37.3) NV (37.1) NY (37.3) TX (37.3)
Average State	47.1	51.6	40.6	41.7	42.0	41.8

Table 7. Change in Composite Index, 1978 to 2008.

Number of States	Change, 1978 to 2008
3 (5.0 and above)	NJ (9.6) MA (6.3) DE (5.7)
15 (2.0 to 4.9)	NE (4.3) MD (4.3) MT (4.3) ND (4.2) NY (3.6) CT (3.4) AR (3.3) HI (3.1) CA (3.0) MI (2.8) MO (2.8) OR (2.5) WA (2.5) WI (2.3) OH (2.3)
23 (1.9 to -1.9)	MN (1.5) IA (1.1) NM (0.7) OK (0.6) KS (0.4) LA (0.4) AZ (0.3) IN (0.3) MS (0.3) TN (0.2) PA(0.1) SD (0.1) CO (-0.7) NC (-0.7) ME (-0.8) UT (-0.9) WV (-1.2) FL (-1.4) VT (-1.4) RI (-1.5) TX (-1.5) KY (-1.6) WY (-1.7)
8 (-2.0 to -4.9)	AK (-2.0) SC (-2.0) GA (-2.4) NH (-2.9) ID (-3.0) IL (-3.1) AL (-3.2) VA (-4.9)
1 (-5.0 and below)	NV (-7.3)

Average Change + 0.64

Table 8. State Intrusion: Sources and Actions

Source or Action	Mean (SD)
State Legislative Intrusion	3.60 (0.60)
State Court Intrusion	2.89 (0.66)
Intrusive Referenda or Voter Initiatives	2.13 (0.91)
State Raids on Local Revenue Sources	3.34 (0.83)
State Shifting New Costs to Cities	3.52 (0.64)

Note: Possible values range from 1 (none) to 4 (frequent).

Table 9. Devolution of Responsibility

Functional Area	Substantial Devolution %	Modest Devolution %	Minimal Devolution %	No Devolution %	Don't Know/ Not applicable %
Personnel	4.78	21.53	29.67	35.89	8.13
Finance	33.01	24.40	20.10	19.62	2.87
Service Provision	19.14	36.36	30.14	11.96	2.39
Administrative Authority	9.09	26.79	29.67	29.67	4.78
Home Rule	13.88	17.22	19.14	36.84	12.92

Figure 1: Impact of State Mandates




Table 10. City Governments' Discretion, Power and Authority

	Mean	SD
Parks and Recreation	-0.04	0.53
Health	-0.11	0.65
Police	-0.12	0.66
Hospitals	-0.14	0.49
Public Welfare	-0.17	0.65
Economic Development	-0.25	0.75
Corrections	-0.26	0.52
Highways	-0.29	0.72
Education	-0.37	0.59
Natural Resources	-0.44	0.69
Land Use and Planning	-0.54	0.68
Financial Administration	-0.58	0.67

Note: Scores indicate whether the amount of discretion, power and authority possessed by city governments has increased (+1), decreased (-1), or stayed about the same (0) since 2000.

Table 11. State Intrusion: Sources and Actions, by State

State	State Legislative Intrusion Mean (SD)	State Court Intrusion Mean (SD)	Intrusive Referenda or Voter Initiatives Mean (SD)	State Raids on Local Revenue Sources Mean (SD)	State Shifting New Costs to Cities Mean (SD)
California	3.67 (0.63)	3.14 (0.55)	2.86 (0.73)	3.89 (0.32)	3.72 (0.51)
Florida	4.0 (0)	2.77 (0.60)	2.62 (0.87)	3.33 (0.65)	3.69 (0.48)
Illinois	3.79 (0.42)	3.26 (0.65)	1.79 (0.79)	3.11 (0.94)	3.89 (0.32)
Kansas	3.0 (0.71)	2.33 (0.58)	1.6 (0.55)	3.6 (0.55)	2.8 (1.10)
Michigan	3.33 (0.52)	2.83 (1.17)	2.33 (0.82)	3.83 (0.41)	3.67 (0.52)
Minnesota	3.63 (0.52)	2.88 (0.35)	1.75 (0.71)	3.63 (0.52)	3.5 (0.53)
Missouri	3.4 (0.55)	3.0 (0)	2.4 (0.89)	2.6 (1.14)	3.0 (1)
New Jersey	3.63 (0.52)	3.25 (0.71)	1.29 (0.49)	3.25 (1.16)	3.5 (0.76)
Pennsylvania	2.8 (0.84)	2.6 (0.55)	2.0 (1)	2.2 (1.10)	3.2 (0.84)
South Carolina	3.8 (0.45)	2.2 (0.45)	1.8 (0.84)	3.2 (0.45)	3.4 (0.55)
Texas	3.81 (0.39)	2.67 (0.58)	2.27 (0.88)	3.36 (0.85)	3.73 (0.55)
Utah	3.78 (0.44)	2.89 (0.60)	1.89 (0.60)	2.67 (0.87)	3.33 (0.5)
Washington	3.4 (0.55)	3.2 (0.45)	2.8 (1.10)	2.5 (1.29)	3.4 (0.55)
Wisconsin	3.83 (0.41)	2.83 (0.41)	1.33 (0.82)	3.67 (0.52)	3.17 (0.75)

Notes: Scores reflect the rate of occurrence and range from 1 (none) to 4 (frequent). Individual state scores are averages of 5 or more respondents.